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USING BIG WORDS TO EXPLAIN LITTLE WORDS
Matthew Chrisman
Background
Sometimes, when I go to dinner parties organized by my
partner, people ask me what I do, and I say that I’m a philoso-
pher. But when I fumble at their questions about ‘my philos-
ophy’, my partner will describe what I do by saying, ‘He uses
big words to explain little words.’ Although this is meant
tongue in cheek, it’s basically right. My philosophical research
is mainly in metaethics and the philosophy of language with a
focus on the semantics of moral words. This means, for
better or worse, that I use big words to explain little words.
The specific little words that I study are those used to
talk about ethics. Words like ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, ‘bad’,
and especially ‘ought’ – as in ‘You ought to tell the truth.’
These are words we use all the time and so clearly under-
stand. So, why do we need to study these words? Because
there are many different levels of understanding. We all
understand these words in the sense that we can use
them, but a language teacher who wanted to teach these
words to her students would need to understand them in a
deeper way. Further still, philosophers and linguists try to
understand these words in a deeper way, in order to
appreciate their logical connections to other words and con-
cepts, as well as to understand how words like these have
meaning in the first place.
The purpose of this paper is to explain why three kinds
of theoretical projects require us to use big words to
explain little words. Specifically, I will discuss what I see as
core projects in ‘metaethics’, ‘philosophy of language’, and
‘formal semantics’. My plan is to first say something about
each of these, then I’ll tie them all together in an attempt to
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say in a way that’s accessible – even if not quite dinner
party material – why in my research I use big words to
explain little words.
Metaethics
Here are two actions that might be thought to be morally
wrong: (i) stealing someone’s lunch money for kicks, (ii)
condoning a non-defensive military action. These are just
examples; you can supply your own if you don’t like mine.
But whatever the examples, almost everyone has some
sense of what actions are right and wrong.
This is the basic subject matter of ethics. We study
ethics as a way of refining and grounding this ethical
sense, with the hope of being clearer and more justified in
our understanding of what’s right and wrong. What do ethi-
cally wrong actions have in common? When we disagree
or are unsure about what we ought to do in a particular
situation, how do we settle the issue? The study of ethics
is concerned with these kinds of issues.
There may be several ways to study ethics, but I think
the philosophical study of ethics is fruitfully divided into
three branches. Normative ethicists seek to articulate
general ethical principles (or ‘norms’). Here, some of the
classical theories are Kantianism and Utilitarianism. From
here, philosophers move to something either more concrete
or more abstract. At the more concrete end, applied ethi-
cists seek to answer questions about specific real-world
ethical dilemmas. There are debates about the legitimacy
of civil disobedience, war, abortion, pollution, etc. By con-
trast, at the more abstract end, metaethicists seek to
answer questions about the legitimacy and role of ethical
thought and discourse in our overall conception of the
world and our distinctive place in it. What that means is
that metaethicists ask questions, such as
† Is ethics universal or culturally relative?
† Are there ethical facts?
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† If there are ethical facts, how do we come to
know them?
† How it is that our ethical commitments can and
should move us to action in various
circumstances?
The core project of metaethics is to answer these
kinds of questions. Instead of asking for principles to tell
when something is right or wrong, as we do in normative
ethics, or asking whether some particular practice is right
or wrong, as we do in applied ethics, in metaethics we ask
about what it means to think or say that something is right
or wrong. To even articulate a normative or applied ethical
viewpoint, one must use ethical concepts and words.
Metaethicists are interested in understanding this general
phenomenon.
A key part of this is, obviously, our ethical language. This
is why studying the language we use to talk about ethical
issues is important for understanding the legitimacy and
role of ethical thought and discourse, which is the core
project of metaethics.
This is generally how metaethicists (including myself) get
interested in the meaning of words like ‘right’, ‘wrong’,
‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘ought’. And almost as soon as one asks
about the meaning of these words, one is struck by the
central philosophical problem that I have spent most of my
(still short!) career working on. On the one hand, ethical
words seem to be just like many other words that we use
to talk about the world around us, but on the other hand
they seem to perform a practical function importantly differ-
ent from a lot of other words.
To see how they are similar notice that just as I can also
say ‘The death penalty is wrong’ to assert my ethical views
about the illegitimacy of the death penalty, I can say ‘The
death penalty is used in few countries’ to assert my non-
ethical views about the prevalence of the death penalty.
Because of this, it’s natural to think each of these asser-
tions expresses one of my beliefs. Moreover, I can, at least
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in principle, be called on to give reasons for my ethical and
non-ethical assertions; what justifies me in believing that
they are true? I can also use both ethical and non-ethical
words in similar logically complex constructions. For
instance, I can say ‘If the death penalty is used in few
countries, then it will die out soon’ but I can also say ‘If the
death penalty is wrong, then it will die out soon’. I can for-
mulate related questions ‘Is the death penalty used in few
countries? Is the death penalty wrong?’ In all of these
respects ethical language seems to be on a par with non-
ethical language.
Because non-ethical language often seems to be describ-
ing things, this has encouraged a descriptivist theory of the
meaning of ethical language. The core idea is that both
ethical and non-ethical statements are descriptions of
reality. As such, they can be true or false, and they’re natu-
rally interpreted as expressing a speaker’s beliefs.
However, to appreciate the other side of this debate,
notice that ethical language seems to play a distinctive role
in our reasoning and talking about action. For instance, if
someone says that the death penalty is more costly than
the alternatives, we don’t necessarily expect her to act in
any particular way. Of course, if we know that she is a gov-
ernmental official primarily motivated by a desire to redu-
cing expense, then we may expect her to oppose the death
penalty on these economic grounds. But it’s also possible
to imagine someone who says this, even though they
support the death penalty. Perhaps they think it is right in
spite of its cost.
By contrast, if someone says that the death penalty is
morally worse than its alternatives, then we do expect him
to oppose it. This expectation must, of course, be tempered
by our understanding of all of the other things that might
motivate the individual to do something. Sometimes people
do what they say is wrong, because they are insincere,
weak-willed, or whatever. If we temper for these, however,
the use of moral words seems much more closely tied to
motivations for action than the use of other words.
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This close link between ethical language and motivation
has encouraged some philosophers to reject descriptivism in
favor of an expressivist theory of the meaning of ethical
language. The core idea is that there is an important expres-
sive difference between ethical and non-ethical statements.
Proponents of this account say that ethical statements mean
what they do because they express some attitude that is
different from belief (e.g. a moral sentiment or special sort of
preference or desire) which plays a special role in the psy-
chology of motivation. The important thing is that the
expression of this attitude is thought to distinguish ethical
language from non-ethical language. Indeed, the fact that
ethical sentence express this attitude rather than a belief in
some fact leads some expressivists to say that ethical state-
ments aren’t literally true or false. As the expression of senti-
ments instead of beliefs about reality, there is nothing
objective and independent of us to make them correct or
incorrect (although we might of course say that some ethical
sentences are true as an especially rhetorical way to
express our own moral sentiments).
The similarities and differences between ethical and non-
ethical language are important because of the way they
lead respectively to descriptivism and expressivism.
However, many metaethicists now think that both of these
theories are too extreme. We seem to need a middle
ground in understanding the nature of ethical language.
Otherwise we remain in the dark about the meaning of
ethical words, which threatens to infect not only our under-
standing of ethical thought and discourse but also our
understanding of its subject matter – ethics. One way of
thinking about much of my own research is that I’m looking
for this middle ground.
This is one of the places where I think we need to use
big words to explain little words. The little words are the
ethical words like ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘ought’.
The big words are whatever theoretical resources we can
come up with, in order to clearly articulate and explain the
similarities and differences in meaning between these
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words and other words. I think the best place to look for
these resources is within the philosophy of language. So, I
turn to that next.
Philosophy of Language
Let’s begin with a contrast between two scenarios: First,
the branch of a tree blows in the wind, scratching out an
intricate pattern in the dirt. Second, a dying man stranded
on an island uses the branch of a tree to scratch out a
message that he hopes someone will read after he dies.
Although there is a sense in which there may be ‘meaning’
in both the intricate pattern and the dying man’s message,
only the latter is meaningful in the sense which philoso-
phers of language try to explain.
They are interested in the peculiar human ability to use
complex and arbitrary signs and sounds to communicate
with one another. The core phenomenon here is semantic
meaningfulness: Words have meanings, and when we put
them together in the certain ways, we form sentences
which have complex meanings. And these complex mean-
ings are related to each other in logically interesting ways.
How is this possible?
There are a number of general theories of how words
and sentences can have meanings, but at the most
abstract level I think we can identify three important ideas.
These are not necessarily incompatible, but theories of
meaning will differ based on which of these ideas (if any) is
thought to be most fundamental.
First, many words and sentences seem to be about
things in the world. The words ‘chair’ and ‘table’ seem to
refer to particular kinds of objects, and the phrase ‘is
beside’ puts into words a relation real-world objects can be
in to one another. Thus, the sentence ‘The chair is beside
the table’ can be said to linguistically represent something
about the way the world is. This kind of connection
between words and the features of the world, which they
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can be used to represent, has seemed to many philoso-
phers of language to be crucial for understanding the
possibility of semantic meaningfulness.
Second, language is clearly an expressive medium (but
not the only expressive medium). That is to say that we
often communicate by using words to express what’s going
on inside our minds. When I say ‘cat’, that expresses a par-
ticular idea; and, when all goes well, it evokes in my audi-
ence that same idea. Similarly, when I say ‘My cat is
brown’, it’s very natural to interpret me as expressing a par-
ticular mental state: my belief that my cat is brown. When
all goes well, if you think I’m being sincere and know what
I’m talking about, you’ll come to believe that my cat is
brown on the basis of my expressing my own belief to the
same effect. This is a simplistic example, but the general
kind of connection between words and the mental states
they can be used to express is a second place many philo-
sophers of language think we need to investigate in order
to understand the possibility of semantic meaningfulness.
Third, once words are put together into sentences, they
stand in logical relations to one another. For example, the
sentence ‘My cat is brown’ entails the sentence ‘My cat
is colored’. That is, if it’s appropriate to apply the predicate
‘is brown’ to something, then it’s appropriate to apply
the predicate ‘is colored’. Something about the meaning of
‘is brown’ and ‘is colored’ underwrites this logical connec-
tion. Moreover, specifically logical words such as ‘or’, ‘all’
and ‘not’ seem to function to encode logical relations
between other sorts of words and sentences. The sentence
‘All my cats are brown or black’ entails that the sentence
‘One of my cats is white’ is false. Something about the
meaning of ‘or’ and ‘all’ underwrites this logical entailment.
Because of connections like these, many philosophers of
language have thought that understanding semantic mean-
ingfulness requires understanding logical relations between
words and sentences.
Like I said above, all three of these ideas are important
in the philosophy of language. Philosophical theories of
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meaning often differ on which of these ideas they take to
be most fundamental. The important point here is that the
question these theories are attempting to answer is about
the foundations of the phenomenon of semantic meaning-
fulness. We can put the basic question this way: why do
words and sentences mean what they do? One place to
look for clues for answering this question comes from the
attempt by linguists to articulate formally what precisely
various sentences of a language like English do mean.
This is the subject of formal semantics. I turn to this next.
Formal Semantics
Linguists have long been impressed with two interrelated
facts about language. The first fact is that children learn to
speak their first language incredibly quickly. If you’ve ever
spent extended time around a toddler who is learning to
speak, you will know the phenomenon well. One minute
they’re learning the word ‘twist’ for the action needed to
open a bottle, an hour later they’re applying this word to
the action needed to turn on the bath. A week later they
seem to know five related words, and a year later they can
use them all in sentences with appropriately conjugated
verbs. The second fact about language is that most of the
sentences we produce and understand in our everyday
lives are novel. For most reasonably complex sentences,
no one has ever put together these exact words in that
exact order to say this exact thing. (That is almost surely
true of most of the sentences in this article, for instance.)
Yet we understand these sentences perfectly well.
These two facts have lead linguists to endorse as a
working hypothesis the idea that language is semantically
compositional. This means that one should in principle be
able to articulate the rules by which the meanings of
complex pieces of language (basically, phrases and sen-
tences) are composed out of the meanings of the most
basic parts (basically, words) and how they are put
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together. No one knows, in anything like a fully comprehen-
sive way, how to articulate the compositional rules of any
specific languages, let alone language in general. But
semantic compositionality is the working hypothesis of
theoretical semantics because it seems to be the only way
to explain how young children could possibly learn their
native language as fast as they do and adults could conti-
nually produce and understand novel sentences with such
ease.
The hypothesis is that language users develop an
implicit understanding of a relatively limited number of
word meanings and compositional rules. Then, they can
use these to compose and interpret an incredible number
of novel sentences. It must be stressed that this knowl-
edge is thought to be implicit know-how. No ordinary
speaker is expected to be able to articulate even one of
these rules, and fluent speakers clearly don’t consciously
think about them when they use language. So, it is the
task of formal semantics to turn this know-how into explicit
principles of a semantic theory. This is much harder than
implicitly grasping the rules. (As an analogy, think of what
you’d have to write down if you wanted to articulate fully
and explicitly how to ride a bicycle to someone who didn’t
already know anything about balancing, creating momen-
tum, shifting gears, and breaking.)
The basic way formal semanticists try to make the implicit
rules of a language explicit is by developing a semantic
model for that particular language. In order to understand
this, it’s useful to compare semantics to meteorology.
Meteorologists try to develop a weather model for a par-
ticular area of the world. This involves a fair bit of abstrac-
tion from many of the detailed specifics of the observed
weather events. The exact location of the rain might not
matter as much as average rainfall in the district. And we
might not care about which specific kinds of trees were
blown over as much as we care that a quarter of the trees
on the north side of all of the streets in a particular town
were blown over. Once meteorologists have abstracted
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from such details, they can begin to use their model to
predict future weather events. The basic aim is to recreate
in a different medium and scale something structurally
similar to the meteorological laws leading to observed
weather events. Once we have a model exhibiting a high
degree of predictive success, we can start to use it to
understand the nature of the meteorological laws under-
lying the weather events that we observe.
Similarly, semanticists try to come up with a semantic
model for a language. This too involves a fair bit of abstrac-
tion from many of the detailed specifics of day-to-day
language use. Lots of ‘um’s and ‘ah’s are omitted.
Idiosyncratic tones and moods are ignored. Idiom and
poetry are suppressed. After abstracting from such details,
the structures of formal logic are then used to model the
content of specific sentences. Linguists do this with the
hope of recreating in a different medium and scale some-
thing structurally similar to the semantic laws by which the
meaning of a whole sentence is a function of the meaning
of its parts. The basic aim in semantics is to predict what a
sentence will be understood to mean. Once we have a
model exhibiting a high degree of predictive success, we
can start to use it to understand the nature of the semantic
rules implicit in a language, which lead to the creation of
novel and complex meanings out of a relatively small
number of initial building blocks.
The main goal of formal semantics, then, is to develop a
semantic model that is capable of giving us an understand-
ing of the semantic rules of a particular language. This is
like meteorology which aims to develop a weather model
that is capable of giving us an understanding of the meteor-
ological laws of a particular geographical region. Of course,
just as meteorological laws change with time and the evol-
ution of a physical environment, the semantic rules change
with time and the evolution of a language. However, we
hope this change is slow enough that an accurate snapshot
(model) of an evolving system is useful in understanding it.
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Putting These Together
I’ve said something about metaethics, philosophy of
language, and formal semantics. I hope this has given you
some basic sense of what each of these is about. These
areas of scholarship are often pursued independently, but
they’re each pursued better when one has an understand-
ing of some of the basic ideas in each area.
Initially, I came at this from the point of view of
metaethics. I became interested in sorts of metaethical
questions bulleted above, which led me to an interest in the
nature and legitimacy of ethical thought and discourse. This
then led me to wonder about how to explain both the simi-
larities and differences between ethical and non-ethical
language. This is the question I presented above: Is the
descriptivist or expressivist theory of the meaning of ethical
words correct?
What I’ve concluded is that this question doesn’t comple-
tely make sense. I now think it runs together two separate
but related questions about the meaning of ethical words.
The first is a question in the philosophy of language, where
we are interested in explaining the nature of the general
phenomenon of meaningfulness: Why do ethical words and
sentences have the meanings that they do? The second
question is a question in formal semantics, where we are
interested in developing semantic models to help us under-
stand the compositional rules of particular languages: What
is the best way to model the semantic rules of our
language, in such a way that it accounts for the similarities
and differences in the semantic contribution of ethical and
non-ethical words to the sentences in which they figure?
The project of answering these questions can be pursued
in tandem, but it should be recognized that they’re different,
and it’s not obvious that one or the other is the more funda-
mental question.
So, why do we need to use big words to explain little
words? Let me give two reasons related to what I’ve
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discussed so far and then finish by working through an
example meant to illustrate the point.
The first reason we need to use big words to explain little
words is that there are a lot of things we can mean by
‘meaning’. As we’ve just seen, there’s an important differ-
ence – which is often ignored even by the theorists
working in this area – between why a word or sentence
has the meaning that it does and the rule-governed contri-
bution a word makes to the overall meaning of sentences
in which it figures. The former is a question in the philos-
ophy of language, while the latter is a question in formal
semantics. The ‘big words’ like the ones we met above:
‘representation’, ‘expression’, ‘inferential relations’, as well
as the formalisms of logic help us to keep these projects
distinct.
The second reason we need to use big words to explain
little words is that answering these sorts of questions
requires conceptual tools that are more precise and fine
grained than everyday language provides us. This is not
surprising. As we saw above, our ordinary knowledge of
the compositional rules of our language is mostly implicit
know-how, rather than something that ordinary speakers
can articulate explicitly. In order to articulate these rules
explicitly, one must develop a vocabulary for talking about
a practice (language-use) which we mostly engage in
without explicit knowledge of the rules.
Let me try to illustrate these two reasons for using big
words to explain little words by considering an example
near and dear to me. Consider the English word ‘ought’. If
we wanted to teach someone who is learning English what
this word means and how to use it, we might first try to find
a word in their native language that has the same meaning.
But not all languages have a word that corresponds directly
to the English word ‘ought’. For example, in English we can
ask about the difference in meaning between ‘ought’ and
‘must’, but there aren’t separate words for these in French.
(Instead French speakers use different moods of the verb
to convey this difference.)
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So, we might start out by noting that ‘ought’ is a modal
auxiliary verb. These are some big words from grammatical
theory, but they help in explaining the meaning of ‘ought’
and how to use it. The fact that ‘ought’ is a verb means
that it plays a specific kind of role in the composition of a
sentence. The fact that it is an auxiliary verb means that it
must always be combined with some other verb to form the
verb-phrase part of a sentence. The fact that it is a modal
auxiliary verb in English means, among other things, that it
lacks conjugation for person and tense and it forms a
system with other words like ‘can’, ‘may’, ‘might’, ‘must’.
One of the most interesting things about these words is
that they have both deontic and epistemic uses. That
means that they can be used to say what is permissible or
impermissible according to some set of rules, or they can
be used to say what is likely or unlikely according to some
set of evidence.
What I’ve just said about the meaning of ‘ought’ is just
the tip of the iceberg, when it comes to explaining the
semantic rules governing the use of the word ‘ought’. (I’m
currently working on a book which aims to go much
deeper.) But this has already required a lot of unordinary
concepts and words such as ‘modal’, ‘auxiliary verb’, ‘con-
jugation for person and tense’, ‘deontic’, and ‘epistemic’.
Don’t worry if you don’t feel like you understand what these
big words mean. My point here is that you can have per-
fectly good implicit knowledge of how to use the word
‘ought’, but when you start to try to make this knowledge
explicit you need a much richer set of conceptual resources
even to scrape the tip of the iceberg.
The need to develop a semantic model for ethical words
like ‘ought’ was the first reason I gave above for using big
words to explain little words. The second reason has to do
with the question of why this word means what it does.
Descriptivists would say that this word means what it does
in virtue of what parts of the world it can be used to
describe. Expressivists would say that this word means
what it does in virtue of the non-belief attitude it can be
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used to express. I think the fact that this word is a modal
auxiliary verb with both deontic and epistemic uses puts
pressure on both of these theories. In order to argue that,
however, and to develop an alternative requires again the
development of new conceptual tools. That is, it requires
one to use big words to explain little words.
Conclusion
I have tried here to explain some of the central projects
of metaethics, philosophy of language and formal seman-
tics. And I have tried to explain why each of these requires
us to use big words to explain little words. We need the big
words to keep these theoretical projects distinct, and in
each case big words give us new conceptual tools for
thinking about how to pursue these projects. I think this jus-
tifies the good use of big words to explain little words, but
let me close with a warning. As in most areas of scholar-
ship, it’s tempting in pursuing these projects to throw jargon
at things we don’t understand very well. This is the bad use
of big words, and it’s bad precisely because it doesn’t
explain anything. In trying to explain things like what it is in
virtue of which ‘ought’ means what it does, or what contri-
bution this word makes to the meaning of the sentences in
which it figures, I think we need to be vigilant against the
bad use of big words, while recognizing the usefulness of
the new conceptual tools represented by the good use of
big words to explain little words.1
Matthew Chrisman is a Lecturer in Philosophy at The
University of Edinburgh. matthew.chrisman@ed.ac.uk
Note
1For helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper, I’d like
to thank Jean Beckley, Nicole Breazeale, Graham Hubbs, Tara
Lloyd, and an audience at the University of Cape Town.
Research for this article was supported by the Arts and
Humanities Research Council.
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